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Introduction 
The last two decades have cast a shadow over the public company. Returns keep 
diminishing and there was not a good sign of wealth creation in cases like Enron and Lehman 
Brothers. Huge increase in passive index funds as 92% of all U.S. based active managers lag 
performance of their respective benchmark (The Wall Street Journal, Apr.12, 2017); retail investor 
ownership stake has a declining trend, while institutional wealth is getting accumulated in the 
hands of the largest asset managers. The passivity of shareholders and shift towards index tracking 
means that shareholders prefer to get rid of their positions in a stock in a case of trouble rather than 
to manage the issue. Mutual and hedge funds well-being is largely dependent on their performance 
and as managers are compensated on quarterly results basis, this implies that executives are more 
concerned with quarterly results rather than long-term growth due to pressure from the funds. 
Meanwhile, corporations from Silicon Valley have turned outside investors in the second-class 
investors with one or none voting rights while keeping the most voting shares in the hands of 
business founders or managers, for example, in Snap IPO the Snapchat founders and app creators 
retain 70% of voting shares (The Wall Street Journal, Jan.16, 2017). 
Accordingly, shareholder activism in on the rise as not everyone agrees with the new 
establishing order. Activists have been around for the long time, but their role, actions and market 
perception keeps evolving. For decades, they were despised and viewed as belligerent corporate 
raiders that are interested in short-term profits in the detriment of long-term growth and prosperity 
of approached companies. One of the most famous activist investors, Carl Icahn, made his fortune 
by acquiring a stake in a company and pushing executives to improve short-term profits, while 
leveraging the company and substantially increasing share repurchasing and dividend payout 
program that occasionally ended up in bankruptcies of targets (Forbes, March 30, 2016).    
However, the perception of activists and their actions started to turn around after the crisis 
of 2008. Recently, Mr. Icahn and other activists’ actions are applauded by such pillars of the 
establishment as Mary Jo White, then the head of US Securities and Exchange Commission, who 
said that shareholder activism has lost its “distinctly negative connotation” (The Economist, 
Feb.15,2014). Nowadays, activism becomes more frequent, and not just in USA, but it is gaining 
in popularity around the world, while recent regulations make activism easier.  
Shareholder activism has different forms and levels of engagement and tools of persuasion 
used in campaigns as well. An investor dissatisfying with a CEO salary and makes an effort to 
change it is vied as activist and so is the hedge fund proposing selling the whole company. Hedge 
funds activism is the most aggressive type of activism engagement, while the most powerful and 
effective due to unique characteristics of such an entity. Activist hedge funds acquire a stake in a 
target company that they think has an unleashed value and act as campaigners trying to obtain 
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other shareholders support for their proposals: board seat, cost or business optimisation, spin-off 
or M&A, or returning cash to investors. Public companies’ executives treat loathe activist investors 
for their opportunism and belligerence. Some claim activist hedge funds to be opportunistic and 
do not create a long-term value, but rather would strip cash and assets in conjunction with 
leveraging the firm. Others treat them as corporate upgraders. They state, that plenty of companies 
suffer from bad management: approximately each tenth of big US based firms and many more 
smaller ones still employ poison pills tactics in order to shelter incompetent executives (Stowell, 
2012).  
The controversial view on hedge fund activism keeps developing as the results of activism 
campaigns still occasionally leave much to be desired and are widely criticized. There are plenty 
of studies that make attempt to analyze consequences of activism intervention in corporate 
governance, operational and strategic decision making of a company, but results are not consistent. 
Some scholars found positive changes in operational and stock performance of companies 
approached by activists, but they are not statistically significant in many cases or other studies 
provide opposite results.  
However, in order to explore market perception of activists and an influence of their 
propositions on shareholders’ wealth, one should look at stock performance around an activism 
campaign announcement as stock price is the best proxy of the market expectation. Some 
researchers used event-study or dynamic portfolio methodology to analyze abnormal returns 
around an activist stake acquisition in an approached company and found that this acquisition is 
accompanied with abnormal returns, however, there is no recent research of the issue, while many 
of the previous demonstrate nonsignificant results at conventional levels.  
This paper uses event-study methodology and analyzes campaigns run by the most frequent 
US-based activist hedge funds that filed Schedule 13D, mailing of which is required by US 
Securities and Exchange Commission if a fund acquires at least 5% stake in a company and is 
going to engage with the board. The research goal of this paper is to define whether activist hedge 
funds entry in a company increases the market value of target companies. The event analyzed is 
publishing of Schedule 13D. 
Research objectives of the research are the following: 
• Define shareholder activism, clarify different types of shareholder activists and 
their goals  
• Examine the trends in activism investing 
• Analyze pros and cons of activist shareholder intervention in a company corporate 
governance and decision making 
	 8	
• Analyze target companies stock performance prior to and after activist hedge fund 
investment 
• Define the effect activist hedge funds make on shareholders’ wealth of target 
companies 
The paper goes as follows: the first chapter provides definition of shareholder activism, 
describes different types of activism engagement, pursued goals and methodology they use. Then 
the recent trends in investing are provided and the effects they make on activism investing are 
explained, that is followed by a review of trends in activism investing. Then the paper summarizes 
scholars’ findings on effects that activism makes on operational performance, corporate 
governance and shareholders wealth. The second chapter describes the methodology used in this 
research, sample creation policy and obtained empirical results. That is followed by managerial 
implications of the research and discussion of associated limitations. 
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Chapter I. Shareholder activism  
§1. Types of shareholder activism and pursued goals 
Activism represents a wide spectrum of activities initiated by one or several shareholders 
of a publicly traded company. An activist is often views as a shareholder who is dissatisfied with 
an aspect of a firm’s governance, management or operations and try to conduct a change within 
the company, but without changing control over it (Morgan Stanley report, 2007).  
The activities fall along a range of significance of the desired changes, assertiveness of 
these activities and its frequency. On the more aggressive end of the spectrum are hedge fund 
activists that seek the most significant change to the board of directors, management or the 
company’s strategy. On the other end are private engagements between shareholders and corporate 
insiders triggered by advisory votes.  
The whole range of shareholder activism types can be split up into the following four 
categories: hedge fund activism, “vote no campaign”, shareholder proposal and say on pay (PWC 
report, March 2015). Each of these groups has unique approach to activist as well as methods they 
employ for achieving desired goals.  
The most aggressive type of activism is hedge fund activism, when an investor, usually a 
hedge fund or a wealthy person aligned with a hedge fund, strives to conduct significant changes 
in the company’s strategy or corporate governance. Some of these activist shareholders have been 
in this game for decades, for example, a renowned investor Carl Icahn, who started his activist 
activity in 1980s. Since then, many new funds were established and this so-called focused type of 
activism became a distinguished asset class. Goals, methods of negotiation and targets of this type 
of investment significantly vary, however, the common characteristic of this asset class is to 
generate returns on investment by unlocking a company’s value by proposing and conducting 
operational changes that result in improving financial performance and increasing share price at 
least in the short-term. These type of interference is caused by investment managers dissatisfaction 
with a portfolio company’s management and lack of progress, and this engagement can be a useful 
tool to catalyze the changes required to deliver returns. These funds often believe that their role as 
fiduciaries for their investors requires them to occasionally pursue this strategy instead of simply 
disinvesting (Activist Insight, 2016).  
Hedge funds differ from pension and mutual funds by their unique organizational structure. 
Unlike other types of funds that have legal restrictions on investments in different asset classes 
and stakes of asset in a specific security, a hedge fund has an ability to use leverage, options and 
other mechanism of gaining an exposure to a specific stock. Hedge funds’ managers earn 
performance-based compensation and due to higher exposure to a stock they are more willing to 
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monitor and effect strategy of portfolio firms. Consequently, their proposals are more likely to 
result in a more convincing threat to a target firm that results in significant effect on other 
shareholders’ wealth as the result of their campaigns (Morgan Stanley report, 2007).  
However, some claim that activist funds enhance the company’s stock price volatility and 
its leverage, thus, obtaining returns in short-term, but fail to make measurable improvements in 
the long-term. This type of activist investors is the main focus of this paper; the methods these 
funds use to address their proposals to the board as well as trends in the field of such investments 
and their targets’ characteristics will be described below with the following discussion of the short- 
and long-term effects on fundamental value.  
The next class of activism is “vote no” campaigns where an investor or coalition of 
shareholders urges other investors to withhold their votes from one or more of the board-nominated 
director candidates (PWC report, March 2015). These campaigns are usually initiated by mutual 
or labor pension funds. This strategy can influence a candidate to voluntary withdraw from the 
election, or a director can be replaced during a subsequent term in the case of a high level of 
negative votes. However, this campaign is rarely successful, because at most companies this would 
require support from a majority of outstanding shares.  
Further down the spectrum of activism engagement is shareholder proposal or the threat of 
a shareholder proposal. This strategy is usually used to address corporate governance issues, that 
could be divided into the following groups: 
• Changes to the board’s governance policies or practices, including: 
o Adopt majority voting 
o Provide proxy access 
o Change the board composition 
o Declassify the board 
• Changes to the company’s executive compensations 
• Changes to oversight of functions, such as audit, risk management and etc. 
• Changes towards corporate social responsibility 
o Climate change preparedness 
o Political spending and lobbying 
o Environmental practices  
This kind of proposals is usually initiated by institutional investors, such as mutual funds, 
labour pension funds and occasionally by big individual investors. These changes are assumed to 
improve governance procedures and transparency and create broader social value that is beneficial 
for the long-term prosperity of the company and increases its value for all shareholders.  
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The last and the most passive type of activism of the spectrum are investor initiatives 
caused by “say on pay” advisory proxy item. This interference is limited to letters or occasional 
meetings/phone calls directed to the compensation committee of the board. The purpose of these 
interactions is to make an effect on change to the compensation plan or alter the way it is described 
in communications with shareholders. Usually, almost all investors participate in this type of 
activism. As “say on pay” is a proxy item presented to all investors for an advisory vote, all 
stockholders with voting rights have to form a view about executive compensation plans. A subset 
of these investors can decide to convey their view to the company; doing so generally does not 
require a substantial amount of resources. These votes are particularly likely to occur if investors 
believe that the most recent plan does not align directors’ remuneration with long-term 
performance and value creation, or utilizes inappropriate performance metrics.  
In spite of the particular class, all activists address the agency problem and expect to have 
capital gains by diminishing the information asymmetry or pressuring executives to act in the best 
interest of shareholders not of executives’ that differ in the most cases (Jensen, Meckling, 1976). 
The general issue is that all recent trends in investing cultivate an environment where executives 
are able serve themselves more than previously could, while owners shift towards passive 
investing and acting more just like stock pickers, not actual owners.  
The following section describes trends in investing and the reasons behind them and how 
they affect what activists do, how and why.  
§2. Recent trends in activism investing 
§2.1. Trends in institutional ownership 
Before turning to a discussion of activist campaigns, we should highlight trends at the 
institutional investors that make huge impact on activist shareholders playing field. In spite of the 
significant growth of activist investing during the last decade, activism as an asset class in 
aggregate holds a small percentage of public funds and public company stocks as the result. Even 
in companies where activist campaigns were launched, these funds typically hold not enough stock 
to play a determinant role in voting outcomes – for example, for campaigns initiated and completed 
during 2015, the median percentage ownership of funds was less than 7% of outstanding stocks, 
while less than 3% of targets had market capitalization of over $20 billion.  
In order to be successful in proxy fights or other campaigns, activist depend on the support 
of the large institutional investors that have become more dominant in the share ownership 
structure. These large investors are usually mutual funds and, particularly, index funds are not able 
to “vote with their feet” when it comes to corporate performance, management and governance 
structure, and they are aware of their critical role that is reflected in their responses to and 
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engagement with a company’s executives and activist shareholders (Sullivan & Cromwell, 2016). 
That is why it is important to consider trends in institutional investing. 
The first issue is associated with ownership structure of shares. Nowadays, more stocks of 
publicly traded companies are in the hands of institutions than it is of retail investors. This 
overweight is not new, in fact, this trend of shifting more ownership from retail investors to 
institutional one has continued in recent years.  
 
 
Figure 1. Retail ownership of public company shares.  
Source: Sullivan & Cromwell, 2016 
This decline actually understates the increase in voting power held by institutional 
investors. From activist shareholder standpoint, this difference within ownership structure is 
critical as these groups have different voting participation level. In 2016, only 28% of retail-held 
shares were voted, compared to 91% of shares held by institutional investors (Sullivan & 
Cromwell, 2016). This declining voting power of retail investors is caused by the elimination of 
broker discretionary voting of uninstructed shares in uncontested director elections. “While 
discretionary broker voting was prohibited in contested elections even before these changes, these 
new rules increased the influence of institutional investors on director “vote no” campaigns and 
on the types of governance changes that removed traditional antitakeover structures from 
companies, such as staggered boards and supermajority voting requirements. The use of notice-
and-access for delivery of proxy materials to shareholders has also contributed to the declining 
voter participation of retail investors” (Sullivan & Cromwell, 2016). 
The relative reason of shift towards passive voting is associated high costs. The costs of 
voting include costs of gathering information, making decision and procedural costs. Some argue 
that given the law that requires institutional investors to make a research and conduct a thorough 
analysis of all information available to make investment decisions, all information costs are 
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negligible for institutional investors. On contrary, others argue that the technical process of voting 
itself constitutes the bulk of all costs associated with voting and that these costs lead some 
institutional investors to passively participate in the voting process (Zetzsche, 2008). Moreover, it 
is not surprising that retail investors are even more willing to avoid such costs, therefore, their 
voting participation is even lower that it is of institutional investors.  
The second issue related to trends in institutional investing is the shift towards index 
investments. In recent years, here has been a notable shift of investments away from funds with 
active management towards passive investing philosophies and index funds in particular. The Wall 
Street Journal noted that as of mid-2016, U.S.-based mutual funds and ETFs that track indexes 
owned 11,6% of the S&P 500, in comparison to 4,6% in 2006. This type of funds now accounts 
approximately 30% of all ETFs and mutual funds (The Wall Street Journal, Oct.25, 2016). The 
main reason for this is that active managers underperform their benchmarks. Over the last 15 years 
ending December 2016, on average, 92% of all US based funds trailed their benchmarks (The Wall 
Street Journal, Apr.12, 2017). Moreover, an additional pressure is made by robots and associated 
high-frequency trading and stock picking. Recently, Blackrock, the largest asset management, 
announced that it relies more on robots than humans in investing decision making. Its stock-
picking unit lagged other funds’ performance and started losing clients, that is why the firm fires 
dozens of personnel and offers clients lower-cost computer systems to make predictions (The Wall 
Street Journal, March 29, 2017).  
The key point of this, is that index funds are not able to react on financial performance, 
management decisions and corporate governance concerns by disinvesting and allocating their 
capital in other companies. In fact, they depend on interaction with companies to propose desirable 
changes and encourage these changes either on their own voting power, activist campaigns or other 
shareholder proposals.  
Moreover, institutional investors influence on proxy voting is enhanced by further 
concentration of capital in hands of the largest institutions and increase in their percentage of share 
ownership. This shift has been for a long-term and it has continued in recent years. The graph 
below demonstrates the average ownership of companies forming S&P 500 by the top four largest 
asset managers: Blackrock, Vanguard, Fidelity and State Street during the last 5 years.  
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Figure 2. Average total stake in S&P 500 companies by four largest asset managers. 
Source: Sullivan & Cromwell, 2016. 
The recent SEC’s proposal of allowing dissident stockholders to list company nominees 
on the dissident proxy card can make the described narrow ownership more impactful. “If a 
dissident shareholder can solicit proxies for a majority of shares, thereby triggering the use of a 
universal proxy card, by reaching out to a small number of large shareholders, it would be much 
less costly for them to run a proxy contest” (Sullivan & Cromwell, 2016).  
§2.2. Trends in activism investing 
As institutional’ ownership level has increased, their role as investors and owners has 
also changed. Some institutional owners began to shift from their conventional passive role 
towards more active participants in the corporate governance processes and policies in their 
holdings. The Investor Responsibility Research Centre reported that 464 proxy proposals 
demanding changes in governance were initiated by public pension plans in the period from 
1987 to 1994 (Gillan, Starks, 2000). 
During the recent years, numerous activist campaigns were launched and proposal were 
made. The data shows an increase in both proxy contests and other types of shareholder 
campaigns, which include public campaigns by activist investors seeking changes at a company 
with the goals of increasing shareholder value and/or enhancing corporate governance practices. 
Full scale proxy contests have developed, on average, in approximately one quarter of all activist 
campaigns announced in each year since 2013.  
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Figure 3. Trend in activist campaigns and engagements. Source: Activist Insight, 2016 
The data shows an increase in both proxy contests and other types of shareholder 
campaigns, which include public campaigns by activist investors seeking changes at a company 
with the goals of increasing shareholder value and/or enhancing corporate governance practices. 
Full scale proxy contests have developed, on average, in approximately one quarter of all activist 
campaigns announced in each year since 2013 (Denes, Karpoff, 2016).  
The formation of activist hedge funds has in large been linked with the performance of 
these type of funds over time, with periods of better performance resulted in foundation of more 
hedge funds. The graph below demonstrates this trend: the foundation numbers increased in 
general, but with a decline during the years following the financial crisis. In the period from 2012 
through 2015, activist formation almost recovered to hit the pre-crisis levels, however, the 
foundation numbers slacked in 2015 and 2016, perhaps, that reflects the more limited opportunities 
for activism that led the performance downturn within the period. 
 
Figure 4. The number of activist hedge funds established through 2000 - 2015.  
Source: PWC report, March 2015 
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The key thing to understand how the activist hedge funds operate could be represented via 
the analysis of target companies and activists’ ownership level in these companies that enabled 
them to conduct changes to the boards. In general, the scheme of approaching to a target company 
is the following: a fund buys 3% of a company and approaches the board with a proposal. In the 
case of the board’s reluctance to implement prosed actions, the fund starts to acquire at least 5% 
of the company and makes public statements via interviews, publications to mass media or issues 
note on its website. It is very important to solicit other institutional investors to support activists 
and secure victory in the upcoming proxy fights. This is where the above-mentioned trends in 
investing play their roles (Gillan, Starks, 2000). The hugest share of voting power is concentrated 
in the hands of a few huge mutual funds, that implies the following: a) activists have only few big 
stockholders to convince in the necessity and expediency of the proposed changes; b) convincing 
a few is already procures significant voting power; c) these huge shareholders a more likely to be 
mutual funds that are either unable to sell their position while being an index followers or they are 
interested in better performance but are not eager to participate in shareholder engagement on their 
own. All these factors are beneficial for activists’ performance (Clifford, 2008). 
The necessity to acquire a significant portion of a company is a serious boundary for the 
range of potential targets. The table below shows the distribution of hedge fund activists deals 
done within the period of 2013-2016 by market capitalization of targets.  
Table 1. Distribution of target companies' market cap during 2013-2016. 
 $100-$500m $500m-$1b $1-$10b $10-$50b >$50b 
% of total campaigns 28% 16% 43% 10% 3% 
2013 campaigns 38% 14% 35% 7% 3% 
2014 campaigns 42% 14% 33% 6% 5% 
2015 campaigns 45% 15% 29% 8% 3% 
2016 YTD campaigns 42% 18% 31% 7% 2% 
Source: PWC report, March 2016 
The following graphs depicts the minimum ownership levels in settlement agreements 
within the same period. As it can clearly be seen, in the most successful agreements, hedge funds 
had to acquire at least 3% of total shares outstanding.  
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Figure 5. Minimum ownership levels in settlement agreements, 2013-2016.  
Source: PWC report, March 2015 
This implies that the most targets are micro to medium capitalization stocks. It is important 
to note, that acquiring small cap issuers is not only easier from invested capital perspective, but 
that these companies have weaker defensive mechanisms. Big companies have resources and well-
developed PR departments to compete with and defend from activists’ public statements. 
Meanwhile, micro-to-small cap companies’ executives do not have this opportunity and it is 
common for them to take a poison pill in a threat of activism campaign.  
Therefore, as in the most cases, activist hedge funds aim obtaining a board seat in a target 
companies, these factors play in favour of activists. The following table exhibits the portion of 
successful board seats taking.  
Table 2. Boards obtained by activists.  
 2013 2014 2015 2016 YTD 
Total board seats obtained 128 169 173 63 
Number of total completed 
campaigns 221 272 300 117 
Average board seats per campaign 0,58 0,62 0,58 0,54 
Source: Sullivan & Cromwell, 2016 
 As the table above demonstrates, activists are more often successful in obtaining the board 
than not. This implies that they are more likely to become able to pressure other members of a 
board and make their proposals come true.  The following section discusses influence that activists 
make on corporate governance, operational performance and shareholder wealth and demonstrate 
why there is still so many controversial findings and opinions on the activism phenomenon.  
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§3. Activists’ influence on operational performance and corporate governance 
§3.1 Positive impact of activism  
Supporters of the increased activism argue that activists’ behavior causes a number of 
positive influences. For example, they argue that targeting a firm entails a close monitoring and 
analysis of management performance and strategic development, thus, this action is beneficial to 
all investors of the firm. Another argument is that activist investors have a long-term focus and 
this helps management improve long-run performance of a company. In contrast, the supporters 
of the institutional or conventional investing model argue, that fund managers lack expertise to 
advise corporate executives. Moreover, the opponents claim that the primary role of hedge funds 
is to manage money for beneficiaries and that activism is a side activity and engaging in it diverts 
managers from the main goal (Gillan, Starks, 2000).  Further the paper provides arguments of each 
side of the discussion and demonstrates that there is still no consensus on the topic.  
First of all, let’s consider pros of activist interference and get back to the argument above 
regarding monitoring of management performance. Due to a free rider problem, scholars argue 
that only a large shareholder has an incentive to conduct monitoring or any other costly activity 
related to the agency problem. All shareholder benefit from such activities, especially if they do 
not bear any associated costs. And as the investor with a big stake in a company has the strongest 
incentive to do the monitoring, he expects a sufficient higher return to cover the monitoring costs 
(Gillan, Starks, 2000). This implies, that having an activist running a campaign is beneficial to 
shareholders in two ways. The first one is that when activists start a campaign they have already 
conducted a thorough research and monitoring and found some inefficiencies in management 
performance, corporate governance or a new opportunity to unleash the company’s value. The 
second thing is that activists bear all the associated costs, not considering further proxy fights.  
The second positive effect is related to a board of directors’ performance. According to the 
theory, investors elect a board of directors to protect the owners’ interests, including hiring and 
monitoring top management. In other words, control rests with the owners and flows to the board 
and managers. However, in practice it is often the opposite process. Management nominates 
directors (read elects) and then shareholders approve them almost always. That is exactly the place 
where the previously described trends in activism took action. Shareholders not just suffer from 
information asymmetry, but due to their passive behavior are heavily reliant on the management 
recommendations of the directors. And those directors are often executives and non-management 
candidates are not considered. Individual shareholders have weak incentives to make an attempt 
to force change due to high associated costs and the costs are borne disproportionally, but the 
benefits of this activity are dispersed evenly among all shareholders. This is another case, when 
	 19	
ordinary shareholders benefit from activists’ actions and do not bear any costs (Angels Advisers, 
2012).  
Moreover, activists’ action positively affect corporate information flow. The empirical 
results demonstrate that activism is associated with higher trading volumes and reduced 
information asymmetry that arises from differential information between investors. That resulted 
was obtained by examining 1362 activists’ proposal during 1988 to 2010. It was found out that 
trading volume increased in the period following proxy filing and that bonds issued during the 
period had lower yield spreads compared to the bonds issued by non-approached companies. As 
for the stocks prices, they impound information through higher volumes of institutional trading 
and became more informative, at least in the short term (Prevost, Wongchoti, 2016). That positive 
effect also was observed in diminished spread between insiders’ and outsiders’ forecasts on stock 
performance after activist campaign announcements.  
Other scholars made an attempt to analyze how activists’ campaigns affect such things as 
tax avoidance and cost of debt. One study conducted on the sample of Korean companies found 
that bondholders view shareholder activism favorably, because it decreases the opportunism for 
the managerial rent diversion at an early stage in the emerging market. Moreover, as activists’ 
presence strengthening the role of investors in the corporate governance system, it leads to lower 
cost of capital for the companies with poor governance (Lim, 2011).  
The question of shareholder wealth creation caused by activist interference is also 
addressed in the literature. One study present evidence of investors wealth effect of activism using 
spillovers of non-target firms. Authors argue that spillovers are instructive as they constitute a 
response to an exogenous stock. In particular, researchers analyze how stock prices of non-target 
firms perform after the initial announce of one Korean hedge fund’s activist campaign. The fund 
examined in the study invests in those companies whose stocks are traded at a significant discount 
due to governance problems while addressing those problems without control contests. The results 
of the research demonstrate that non-target companies that grant fewer rights to outside 
shareholders experience a more positive stock price reaction to the announcement. The result is 
consistent with the gains to outside investors from activism campaigns, because poorly governed 
companies are more likely to come under this disciplinary pressure from shareholders in the future. 
The study also shows negative relationship between the abnormal returns of non-target firms and 
the quality of corporate governance and authors highlight that this negative relationship is 
extremely rare during non-event time periods (Lee, Park, 2009).  
Analyzing stock returns or abnormal returns around announcement date may be challenged 
by argument that the market reacts not on activists’ campaigns, but rather on the big stake of a 
company acquired. In fact, when a fund makes a 13G filling that is required to be done if a fund 
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acquires at least 5% of a target company and not going to engage in discussion with the board 
(passive investing, in other words), the target’s stock experience some significant abnormal 
returns. However, this abnormal return is less than that of activists 13D Schedule filing (Clifford, 
2008). This study reveals that difference in means and medians of cumulative average abnormal 
returns around 13D and 13G filings demonstrate that the market reacts more favorably to 
companies approached by activists that those targeted by passive investors. Activists’ targets earn 
a mean of 3,39%, while CAR of firms targeted by passive investors has a mean of 1,64% and the 
difference in returns is significant at all conventional levels.  
Taking in to account that targets of activist campaigns experience significant excess returns 
around the announcement date a reasonable question may arise regarding whether these returns 
are the result of expectations about improved governance or it has something to do with operating 
performance. Many researchers found limited evidence of operating performance improvements 
(Smith, 1996; Karpoff et al 1996). Some, on contrary, find that firms targeted by activist funds 
experience a median increase in ROA of 1,17% the year following the announcement date. Similar 
result is observed for the two-year period after the announcement (Clifford, 2008). The author also 
reveals the positive shift in industry-adjusted ROE and as the obtained result is contradicts other 
researchers’ findings (Klein, Zur, 2008), Clifford brakes down the ROA into simple elements and 
examined whether the improvement in operational efficiency is driven by reduction in assets, 
progress in cash flow, or both. The result demonstrates that firms targeted by passive and activist 
investors experience reduction in EBITDA in the consecutive year after stake acquisition, but the 
difference in means and medians of the two groups are not statistically significant. But targets of 
activist hedge funds demonstrate larger decrease in total assets that targets of passive investors do. 
Therefore, improvement in ROA value is mainly caused by reduction in assets rather than in 
improvement in cash flows. These results are consistent with the research outcome of Bethel el al 
(1998). 
In fact, many activists’ campaigns end up with some asset divestitures, but it should not be 
treated negatively. Looking at activists’ demands and intentions reveals that spin-off and 
improving operational performance are ones of the most frequent demands. Activists bear costs of 
monitoring, analyzing and defining businesses the sale of each would be beneficial for a company 
and its investors in the long-run. There are plenty of examples of a such divestments: Motorola, 
Volvo and etc. In each of these examples there were a clear extractable flaw – a division that 
caused negative operating result, or while bottom line was positive, profitability was low that 
dragged the whole company performance down.  
Taking into account activists’ demands is crucial in analyzing the impact of their actions 
on such things as operational performance and total asset values. While some demand spin-offs or 
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assets sale, others, on contrary, offer conducting acquisitions and expansions. Therefore, creating 
a sample of all activist campaigns during a period of time and calculate average ROA, ROE and 
so on may be incorrect, as some effects of one demand is getting offset by effects of the opposite 
demand, thus, a researcher obtains average low and/or not significant results in improvement of 
operating performance. That means, that there is still a research gap in analyzing activists’ 
influence on operating performance, and that the stock price is still the best measure of activists’ 
proposals and subsequent actions.  
Next, a popular argument against activist campaigns is that these hedge funds focus only 
on short-term profits rather on long-term value of a target company. Therefore, in order to define 
is this argument is fair, the long-term returns of the targeted firms by activists should be examined. 
One study used calendar-time portfolio approach with Fama-French 3 – factor model to estimate 
the long-run excess returns. The hypothesis of this research was that average monthly access return 
on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. However, the empirical result demonstrates that average 
monthly excess return of activists’ targets is not just positive, but statistically significant in each 
of 1 to 3 – year periods following entry in a company. This positive effect is also demonstrated by 
passive entries of 13G fillers, however, in the case of activists’ entry the annualized excess return 
was 22,32% in the first year following the stake acquisition, but passive investors generated only 
7,80% of excess returns. However, there is no evidence that activism generates long-run abnormal 
returns. For the one year period following the entry, activists’ targets yielded an annual excess 
return of 4,68% over the passive investors portfolio, but the result is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels (Clifford, 2008). On contrary, another author found that his sample 
experienced a favorable valuation effect over each of one to three-year interval after activists’ 
interventions. The cumulative result over the three-year period exceed market performance by 
23% and additionally the researcher found that valuation effect is more modest when an activist 
campaign is initiated by individual shareholders (Akhigbe, Madura, 1997).  
Many of the previously stated studies use abnormal returns as a measure of market reaction 
on activists’ performance and make conclusions based on these information, but they do not 
address the issue of where the announcement premium comes from. Later in the section of 
analyzing empirical results of this research, a problem of identifying concrete purposes of activism 
will be discussed, but it is reasonable to assume that market expects and thus creates value from 
some improvements in firms as going concern, either by changing board composition, turning 
down CEO or other operational and financial reforms. One study made a hypothesis that returns 
to investors are driven by activists’ success at getting target firms taken over. This hypothesis is 
aligned with the proposition made earlier that shareholder returns should be examined by activists 
demands rather than all together. Under this hypothesis, stock prices increase around 13D filing 
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date reflects market’s expectation that the firm will be acquired with a premium to the current 
price. From activists’ perspective, this outcome is doubly beneficial – not just they generate stock 
premium from following acquisition, but also avoid price pressure associated with exiting their 
position. The main result of the study is that high returns occur primarily when a takeover takes 
place, however, as the majority of activists’ targets are not eventually getting acquired, those firms’ 
abnormal returns around that date of announcement are not statistically significant. Moreover, the 
result is also demonstrated by the drift in long-term returns following the initial acquisition of 
stake in a company. This implies that the returns associated with activists’ campaigns are largely 
explained by the activists’ ability to force target firms into a takeover and collecting an acquisition 
premium (Greenwood, Schor, 2009).  
This result has an important managerial implication related to this research paper. 
Basically, Greenwood et al says that abnormal returns around a campaign announcement date is 
explained by activists’ ability to win proxy fights and conduct the proposed changes or actions. 
That implies, that activists’ experience is the key factor and that is why this paper focuses on hedge 
funds that has activism as a primary focus of their activities.  
§3.2. Negative impact of activism 
The main argument against activists’ interference in the corporate governance system or 
operational and strategic decisions of target companies is that these hedge funds are oriented on 
short-term results. Supporters of this statement argue that some shareholders demonstrate their 
penchant for rapid returns on investments, placing pressure on executives to favor short-run results 
even at the expense of long-run performance. Although short-termism is not limited to a particular 
class of shareholders, this effect is mostly attributable to hedge funds as their investment strategy 
naturally consists of buying and holding stocks for short periods of time, including speculation 
strategies (Correia, 2014). Some argue that short-termism presents the potentially most important, 
most controversial, most ambiguous, and most complex problem associated with hedge fund 
activism (Kahan, Rock, 2007). However, hedge funds are not the only investment vehicles that are 
suspected in this practice. Many high-turnover funds’ portfolio managers use speculation, because 
many of these institutions engage in quarterly evaluation of their performance that is vital in the 
industry, therefore, the managers are interested in have to focus on delivering short-term results.  
Another issue associated with activism investing is earnings management. While many 
researchers focus on and investigate its impact in firm performance, ownership monitoring and 
organizational performance, only a few made an attempt to define the impact activist hedge funds 
make on earning management – an accounting phenomenon of manipulating financial results. The 
study conducted by Hadani et al (2011) explored the impact of shareholder proposal and 
monitoring on earnings management. They argue that due the public threat to executives’ 
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legitimacy and reputation that is usually posed by activists, and the challenges that shareholder 
proposal present to executives, management is more likely to engage in earning management just 
in order to signal their managerial capabilities and hold their current positions in company 
structure. The research found positive correlation between shareholder proposals and earning 
management. This effect is especially in nano- and micro-capitalization stocks as these companies 
do not have developed public relationship departments and money for proxy fights and thus are 
more prone to use aggressive defensive mechanisms such as earnings management and other forms 
of poison pills.  
The other argument on negative activism influence is related to firm disclosure. Some firms 
that are subject of potential approach by activist hedge funds are advised by law firms and 
investment banks to regularly monitor changes in activists’ stakes in company and to prepare 
confrontational campaigns by reviewing external communication processes and policies 
(Christopher, Sheng, 2007; Gelles, 2013). This implies that when a firm detects a small increase 
in ownership by activist or group of activist hedge funds it may diminish the guidance information 
in order to avoid further attention from activists. Moreover, once a company is approached by 
activist and the demands are announced, a company’s operating and financing environment is in 
flux, it is not surprising that current management suddenly loses ability to make accurate forecasts 
on future sales, expenses and other accounting measure that directly affect the bottom line and 
cash flows. Thus, even if activists’ demands include some kind of corporate governance reform 
and enhanced disclosure and guidance in general, it unintendedly can cause reduction in guidance 
information provided to the market participants (Chen, Jung, 2016).  
Moreover, as it was discussed earlier in this paper, stock returns serve as a proxy of market 
reaction activists’ proposals and subsequent changes in corporate governance and operating 
performance. Some made an attempt to analyze long-term returns, however, scholars’ definition 
of long-term returns varies from one to five-year period. These studies found some positive drift 
in stock returns within this period, but there is a problem associated with uncertainty about the 
linkage between cause and effect that is exacerbated by long-term stock returns measure. In some 
cases, activists’ efforts indeed lead to a notable improvement in operational performance and stock 
price appreciation, however, it is challenging to state with confidence that activism per se caused 
the changes (Morgan Stanley report, 2007). In fact, many studies made an effort to evaluate long-
term performance, but most of them failed to provide significant results (Guercio, Hawkins, 1999).  
Also, analyzing activists’ influence on corporate governance procedures, strategic and 
operational decisions, some may raise a question regarding a board of directors’ view on the issue. 
NYSE Governance Service made a survey that included responses of more than 300 directors of 
public US companies. The results are clearly not in the favor of activists: 84% of directors claim 
	 24	
that most of activists do not represent the interests of other shareholders of a company, while 85% 
think that activists are focused on short-term results; 63% of directors believe that activists had 
not make an effect on boards’ ability to attract quality members, while 47% think that activists 
nominated directors remain independent of the origins of their nomination (NYSE Governance 
System report, 2016).  
To sum up, activism is a widely-discussed research topic that still has no consensus. While 
some provide evidence, that targets of activists’ campaigns experience such benefits as improved 
corporate governance policies and procedures, enhanced transparency and executives and board 
of directors’ performance with associated wealth creation for all of the shareholders, others provide 
counterarguments such as short-termism of hedge funds investing nature and earnings 
management caused by activists’ interventions. In general, activism is viewed as an additional 
monitoring mechanism that diminish information asymmetry between shareholders and executives 
that not only addresses agency problem, but bears all of the costs associated with the monitoring. 
However, the real debate arises in evaluation of activists’ effect on target companies. Many studies 
provide contradictory results to others regarding topics on operational performance improvement 
and stock performance in the long run. While positive shift in operational metrics such as ROA or 
ROE do occur and stocks experience abnormal returns in the long run, these results fail to pass 
significance tests in the most cases or there is uncertainly that activists’ proposals and changes 
were the catalyst of these improvements.  
That is why the author of these research argues that stock return is the best measure of the 
market’s treatment to activists and their proposals. And as the market view on activism evolves, 
this paper contributes by conducting the most recent analysis of the issue. 
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Chapter II. Empirical study 
§1. Research methodology 
The literature review above shows that researchers are not solidary regarding activists’ 
proposals and actions. However, the market opinion is identifiable by looking at stock prices’ 
performance when news about proposals come up. The methodology of the research is event study 
as the stock prices and returns around the event serve as the best proxy for market view on the 
event. In general, event-study methodology uses financial market data to measure the impact of 
event on the market value of a firm or security.  
An event study examines the behavior of a company’s stock prices around a corporate or 
another important event. In a corporate context, event study is useful in determining the magnitude 
of the unanticipated impact of the event on the company’s shareholders’ wealth. As researchers 
argue, the market is rational and the effects of the event are will be reflected immediately in a 
security price (McKinley, 1997). Therefore, event study methodology focuses on announcement 
effects in a short- or long-term horizon around an event and provides relevant evidence for 
understanding corporate policy decisions (Kothari, 2004).  
Moreover, event study methodology plays an important role in researching and testing 
capital market efficiency. Systematically nonzero abnormal returns of a security around a 
particular event are inconsistent with the theory of market efficiency. Accordingly, event studies 
that focus on long-term horizons following a corporate event can provide significant evidence on 
market efficiency (Fama, 1991).  
The following section describes the methodology in details.  
§2. Empirical model 
This paper analyzes how the market views hedge funds activists’ proposals and how it 
reacts on the activist campaign launch. Therefore, the event is filling 13D Schedule that is required 
by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission if a fund acquires at least 5% of a public company 
and is going to engage with the board of the target. The 13D Schedule is available at SEC website 
and its filing is a public information that causes specific market reaction.  
As for the methodology, event studies use daily (occasionally intraday and 
weekly/monthly) security return data that allows precise measurement of abnormal returns and 
more useful studies of announcement effects. Scholars use different time horizons in the analysis 
of activist campaigns impact on market value of target firms. Some use 2- or 5-day period, while 
some studies use bigger time-frame in the attempt to analyze long-term effect of such intervention 
in the corporate governance of a firm. This study uses two time frames – seven days and 127 days 
that represent six calendar month. The purpose of this is to demonstrate and analyze the 
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significance of obtained results both in short-term and long-term range. Moreover, it is important 
to check that the sample is not biased and does not include other significant events. Obviously, 
checking each company in the sample for this time frame is challenging task and defining a hurdle 
rate of return to exclude a company from the sample is very subjective, however, the sample was 
skimmed for other significant returns and stocks having a daily return over 50% were excluded 
from the sample. 
 In general, the process of conducting an event-study looks as follows: 
1. Identify sequence of securities that are eligible for the event-study 
2. Obtain and match time series of a security returns and their reference index 
3. Using regression analysis on the time-period prior to the event, calculate the 
models’ coefficients that explains the relationship between security and index 
4. Using the regression model, calculate expected or normal returns for the whole 
period concerned 
5. Deduct calculated expected returns from the actual market returns, calculate 
cumulative abnormal returns 
6. Check the significance of results  
There are several alternatives in the methodology of conducting an event-study analysis. 
The model used in this research paper is based on the work dedicated to event-study analysis by 
Kothari, 2011. Let t = 0 represents the date of 13D Schedule filling by an activist. For each security 
i in the sample, the return of the security is for time period t relative to the event, Rit, is: !"# = %"# + '"#		(1) 
where Kit is the expected return given a particular model, and eit is the component of 
abnormal or unexpected return. 
The abnormal return represents the difference between the return conditional on the event 
and the expected return unconditional to the event, therefore, the abnormal return is a direct 
measure of the change in investors’ wealth associated with the event (Kothari, 2011). In this paper, 
S&P500 index was used as a measure of market return in the described single factor model. 
An event study aims to define whether the cross-sectional distribution of returns at the t =0 
is abnormal, and that could be done in different ways. In this paper, the focus is on the mean of 
the distribution of abnormal return. The null hypothesis to be tested is that the mean abnormal 
return equals zero at time t. For a sample of N securities, the cross-sectional mean abnormal return 
for any date t is: 
,,!# = 1- '"#	(2)/"01  
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Also, this paper analyzed whether mean abnormal returns for 127-day period around the 
date of 13D Filling equal zero. This test demonstrates whether an activist entry was expected and 
how efficient the market was and what are the short-term reflections on the event. The cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) uses as the abnormal performance measure the sum of each 
day’s average abnormal return and is defined as follows: 
2,,! 31, 35 = ,,!#		#0#6#0#7 (3) 
For CAAR performance measure a test statistic was compared to its assumed distribution 
under the null hypothesis and computed as:  3 − :3;3<:3<= = 2,,! 31, 35>5 31, 35 ?,@ 		(4) 
where: >5 31, 35 = B>5 ,!# 		(5) 
§3. Sample description  
The data was collected by going through SEC EDGAR searching engine and Thomson 
Reuters DataStream report on activists’ campaigns. In the sample were included activist funds that 
run at least 10 campaigns during 2011 – first half of 2016 and filled 13D Schedule. Filling this 
schedule is required if a fund purchased at least 5% stake in a company within previous 10 days 
and managers of the fund are going to engage in discussion with the board of the target. The reason 
for picking the most active activists is that they have a superior ability to select target firms and 
have a record of successful deals that gained them reputation and clout and expertise (Krishnan, 
Partnoy, 2016). Thus, they are able to target large firms and launch successful proxy fights and 
pressuring target firms’ boards and overcoming executives defense mechanisms. By drawing the 
line between active and occasional hedge funds activists, two issues are solved. One of them is 
that market does not guess on outcomes of future proxy fights as previous record of deals facilitate 
the process of forecasting. The second is that the sample is clean from uncertainty around 
occasional investors’ effort that could make harm while having good intentions just due to the lack 
of expertise in the field. Therefore, the sample includes activists with quite forecastable outcomes 
and the market reaction purely reflects the market’s view on activists ‘proposals.  
 The date of filling the schedule is the event date that is analyzed with the stock returns 
examined in the range of 180 days prior to and after the event that resulted in +/-127 business days. 
This period of time is appropriate as it allows to see market reaction not just within a week or so, 
but also demonstrates how the market reacts on further ongoing proxy fight and activists’ 
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engagement with the board. At the same time, the period is not long enough to be significantly 
influenced by other possible market events that could bias an observation.  
This criterion generated 15 funds and 312 campaigns. However, the decision was made to 
completely exclude Bulldog Investors PLC and its 26 campaigns from the sample as the fund 
invested in other funds or REITs which shares traded at a significant discount to net assets value 
of funds. The purpose of this exclusion is that stock price of a fund reflects changes in its portfolio 
companies and distinguishing between market reaction on activist proposals and price changes of 
the portfolio is a challenging task that lies beyond the purpose of this research paper. Moreover, 
due to absence of trading data some campaigns had to be excluded, thus, the sample consists of 14 
top active hedge funds with 259 campaigns or company entries in total. The table below provide 
data on the sample. 
Table 3. Sample data 
N Fund 
# Campaigns 
total 
# Campaigns in 
sample 
1 Bulldog Investors LLC 26 0 
2 Cannell Capital Management 10 8 
3 Carlson Capital LP 10 10 
4 Clinton Group Inc. 12 11 
5 Corvex Management LP 10 8 
6 Elliott Associates LP 22 20 
7 GAMCO Investors Inc. 43 44 
8 Icahn Partners LP 34 31 
9 JANA Partners LLC 15 12 
10 
Lone Star Value Management 
LLC 10 9 
11 PL Capital LLC 16 16 
12 
Raging Capital Management 
LLC 13 12 
13 Starboard Value LP 37 32 
14 The Stilwell Group 40 33 
15 ValueAct Capital Partners LP 14 13 
Total  312 259 
 
As for the purpose of starting activists’ campaigns, this data was collected from Thomson 
Reuters report on activists’ activity and presented in the chart below. 
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Figure 6. Sample activists' demands 
Source: Thomson Reuters 
 
The demands mentioned above should be clarified. “Board Representation” is the most 
common demand as obtained seat in board of directors allows an investor to make a real impact 
on decisions made in the company. The most recent examples of this demand are Sarissa Capital 
Management LLP targeting three board seats in Innovia (CNBC, 13.03.17), while Oasis 
Management acquired a seat in Premier Foods on March (The Telegraph, 1.03.17).  
The “Force Sale” demand stands for selling the whole company when its operations and 
financial performance struggle and selling the company is probably the only way to reduce 
shareholders’ losses by associated stock appreciation before M&A deal. An example – Corvex 
Management urged Ralcorp Holdings to sell itself in 2012. 
Next, “Hostile Acquisition” means an activist’s intention to acquire the company. The most 
frequent demand is demonstrated by Carl Icahn as he approached six different companies during 
the period considered, for example, he made several attempts to acquire Greenbrier Inc, a rail-car 
manufacturer, but he did not succeed.  
The “Oppose Sale” is the opposite move to the previous one. In this case activists make an 
attempt to prevent the sale of a company when thing that offered price for the company is too low 
or the deal is not necessary for the further growth of the company. An example is Lone Star Value 
letter to the board of SWS Group in order to turn down the acquisition offer made by Hilltop 
Holdings. 
Further, “Seek Alternatives” stands for suggesting some strategic moves or changing the 
current strategic or operational decisions that would allow to unlock value for shareholders. This 
demand represents the second biggest portion of demands in the sample, falling behind board 
representation demand. However, unlocking the value is the ultimate goal of hedge fund activism. 
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“Shareholder rights” group of demands represents activist shareholders’ intentions to make 
changes in governance, remuneration and other policies. For example, PL Capital sent three letters 
to Bank of California regarding their issues in negotiating with shareholders, CEO compensation 
and some other shareholders’ concerns (Seeking Alfa, 07.01.17).   
The “Spinoff” demand speaks for itself – activists demand a sale of spinoff of a company’s 
division. There are some famous spinoffs, such as Xerox, Motorola, EBAY and many others. In 
this case, activists manage to find an extractable flaw – an underperforming division that is usually 
non-core business unit of a company that usually drags the whole company’s performance down.  
As for the market capitalization of targets, the sample is consistent with the research 
outcomes of other papers dedicated to activists: the majority of targets were from Nano – to Small 
capitalization stocks.  
 
Figure 7. Capitalization of targets 
Source: Thomson Reuters 
 
It should be stated that there is no one set framework that defines different market caps, 
and the one used in the paper is the most widely used.  
The sample covers companies from many industries, that is why for classification and 
further analysis purposes, this paper uses Standard Industrial Classification system. 
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Figure 8. Industries presented in the sample 
Source: Thomson Reuters 
 
 
The distribution of number of campaigns run within 5-year period in sample is shown 
below.  
Table 4. Number of campaigns per year 
Year # of campaigns 
2011 50 
2012 53 
2013 36 
2014 37 
2015 54 
2016 29 
Total 259 
 
To sum up, the sample of this research paper consists of 14 activist funds that run at least 
10 campaigns during the period of Jan.2011-Sept.2016. The event of the study is the date of filling 
13D Schedule by activist funds, and stock data was collected for +/-128 business days around the 
date or six calendar months. The total number of observations (campaigns) is 259, while 
distribution of activists’ demands, targets’ capitalization and industries were described above. The 
following part of research is aimed to present a model used in the event study. 
 
§4. Empirical Results  
The paper used the described model above and the following results were obtained. First 
of all, conducting the event-study for the whole sample of 259 companies within 127- and 7-day 
time range demonstrated significant positive results. In the day of filing 13D Schedule, the market 
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demonstrated huge abnormal returns with CAAR(-127;127) of 0,089 and t-test of 2,202, while 
CAAR(-7;7) was 0,073 and t-test equaled 3,089. The result is significant at 5 percent level. The 
chart below demonstrates the result.  
 
Figure 9. The event-study result 
The chart clearly depicts the market reaction – an activist fund entry in a target company 
is viewed as positive intention that potentially increases wealth of shareholders. The additional 
observation is that the market is quite effective – the prices of targets are adjusted quickly, with 
the most price changes being done within first few days after the event.  
Moreover, it is a point of interest to analyze market reactions on different activist proposals 
and how stock prices of targets reflect market reaction in dependence on a target market 
capitalization and industry. The information with results regarding activists’ proposals is presented 
below. 
Table 5. Event-study results by activist demands 
Demand 
# of 
campaigns 
CAAR  
(-7;7) 
t-test  
(-7;7) 
CAAR  
(-127;127) 
t-test  
(-127;127) 
Board 
Representation 104 0,64 3,45 0,14 2,72 
Force Sale 10 0,15 1,66 0,405 2,89 
Hostile 
Acquisition 10 0,20 1,97 0,16 1,09 
Oppose Sale 6 0,24 1,42 0,01 0,03 
Seek Alternatives 75 0,07 2,81 0,076 1,35 
Shareholder Rights 43 0,04 1,92 -0,08 -1,05 
Spinoff 11 0,06 1,50 0,07 0,83 
Total 259     
 
Before commenting obtained results, it is important to say that some outcomes either 
positive or negative ones may not be representative even if t-test denotes significance at 5 or 10 
percent level. The reason of this the small amount of campaigns or observations within a category. 
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The chart below demonstrates cumulative average abnormal returns for 7-days period and 
depicts short-term market reaction.  
 
Figure 10. 7-days CAARs by different activist demands 
As the figure above depicts, prior to Schedule 13D filing CAARs were around zero that 
proves that the econometric model used in predictions is a solid one, while all demands were 
viewed positively by the market that resulted in abnormal returns, but to the different extent. The 
highest return is demonstrated by oppose sale demand that cumulated 24% of return around the 
date, the second highest return was generated by hostile acquisition attempt that generated 20% of 
abnormal returns, while the significant result is only demonstrated by the second demand among 
the described ones.  
The least CAARs were generated by shareholder rights and quite close results were 
obtained by other demands. Taking into account, that shareholder rights demand influences 
communication policies and addresses other corporate governance issues and possibly enhance 
premium for good governance, but does not directly mean significant changes in operations, 
strategy or financials, it is not surprisingly that associated abnormal return is lower than it is of 
proposed changes in items directly affecting shareholders’ wealth.  
However, the result changes when long-term time frame is being analysed.  
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Figure 11. 127-days CAARs by different activist demands 
Not surprisingly, activists’ intervention in a company with an intention to sell the target 
company leads to the highest return as the stock price of a potential takeover company rises on 
rumours of possible deals and especially high returns are shown when the deal in fact takes place.  
Usually, activist hedge funds propose selling a company when it performs extremely poorly 
and generates losses to shareholders. These big losses imply low valuation that makes a company 
a good target for a potential acquisition, while rumours and especially stated plan of future sale of 
a company significantly increase its share prices. That is why the news of a company sale is 
favourably viewed by shareholders in this case and sometimes as the only option to get some 
capital back from the falling knife stock. 
The similar picture is shown by activists’ intention to acquire a target company as the 
market follows the same logic regarding the possible acquisition. Shareholders’ rights concern as 
the reason for entry in a company performs in the similar pattern in the long-run as it does in the 
short-term period.  
Good positive results are shown by campaigns with board representation demands. The 
amount of observation is quite high, representing almost half of the sample, and t-test denoted 
significance of both 7 and 127 cumulative average abnormal returns. The board representation 
demand is the most frequent demand of activists as board seat enables them implement other 
changes or proposals. This demand together with force sale demand represent are most significant 
ones in terms of t-test and CAAR in both 7- and 127- day period. It has the following explanation.  
As for the board representation demand, it is important to remind that other demands are 
also likely to be accompanied with board seat demand as it facilitates the process of conducting 
proposed changes. However, for the purpose of this research, campaigns with several stated 
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demands were marked in accordance with the first stated demand from Thomson Reuters data. 
Thus, it was expected that the whole sample performance picture looks similar to that of board 
seat demand and that hypothesis turned out to be true.  
Also, this paper describes how the market reacts on activists’ entry in target companies of 
different market capitalization. The outcomes are presented in the table below. 
Table 6. Event-study results by targets' market capitalization 
Market 
Cap 
# 
Campaigns Limit, $M 
CAAR  
(-7;7) 
t-test  
(-7;7) 
CAAR  
(-127;127) 
t-test 
 (-127;127) 
Nano 42 50 0,065 0,716 -0,020 -0,195 
Micro 75 300 0,054 0,521 0,072 1,295 
Small 68 2000 0,075 0,635 0,163 3,043 
Middle 53 10000 0,088 0,611 0,143 2,231 
Large 21 200000 0,084 0,678 -0,011 -0,140 
Total 259      
 
In the case of market capitalization as the criteria for the analysis, number of campaigns 
per group are distributed more evenly. The column “Limit, $M” represents the upper bound of 
market capitalization within the group expressed in millions of dollars. As it was mentioned above, 
there is no universal set frame for differentiation market capitalizations and that the most frequent 
one is used, thus, this paper considers a company to be a middle cap stock if it lies within 2 – 10 
billion. The chart below demonstrates obtained results for the 7-day period. 
 
Figure 12. 7-days CAARs by different market capitalization of targets 
As the chart depicts, all categories of market capitalization demonstrate quite similar 
pattern of cumulative returns behaviour. The highest return was generated by investing in targets 
of middle and large cap stocks, while peers from micro and nano capitalization groups 
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demonstrated the least returns. On the one hand, the result may be seemed as unexpected, because 
small cap stocks are considered to be more volatile and higher abnormal return is expected, on the 
other, these cap stocks have more speculative nature, that is why CAARs behaviour may be 
justified by saying that activists’ entry as an information is less valuable and informative for small 
cap stocks than it is for large cap companies. Also, it should be stated that 7-days period frame 
does not provide any statistically significant result on each of the groups, however, for longer time 
frame the situation changes. 
 
 
Figure 13. 127-days CAARs by different market capitalization of targets 
 
Significant results according to the model are demonstrated only by small and middle cap 
stocks, while they generated average cumulative abnormal return of 16,3% and 14,3% during six 
calendar month, respectively.  
An interesting observation was found, that while CAARs behavior around the event date 
in the short run demonstrated similar patters as it was discussed earlier, but in the long-run the 
results are opposite. Small cap stock continued to stay on top in terms of total abnormal return and 
mid cap stocks continued to rise as well, however, large and nano cap stocks CAARs ended up in 
the negative area. As for the nano cap stocks, one of the possible explanations of such behavior is 
that executives of this capitalization group are more prone to use aggressive defense mechanisms 
such as poison pills that managers of significant capitalization companies due to lack of experience 
in coping with activists and weak PR function to deal with the public pressure associated with 
activists’ intervention in the company. As for the large capitalization stocks, possible explanation 
is opposite to the previous one – management is experienced and have tools to offset activists’ 
efforts while not using value destructive mechanisms. This idea is supported with the statistics 
provided earlier in this paper – activists rarely approach large cap companies as they may not have 
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enough capital to accumulated significant stake in a company to make propositions and have real 
weight in proxy fights or attracting additional capital is costly.  
The author also analyzed the market reaction on activists’ entry in a company in accordance 
with targets’ divisions. The sample contains plenty of companies representing different industries 
and as the sample is not very big for a such diversified variable as industry, the decision was made 
to group companies in accordance with Standard Industrial Classification system. The system 
enabled the researcher to spilt companies into the following groups (Note: divisions with less than 
10 representatives were united for the research purposes): 
Table 7. Event-study results by targets' division of operations 
Division # Campaigns 
CAAR  
(-7;7) 
t-test 
 (-7;7) 
CAAR  
(-127;127) 
t-test  
(-127;127) 
Construction, 
Mining, Electric & 
Gas, Wholesale 
trade 14 0,141 0,600 0,297 1,877 
Manufacturing 96 0,072 0,610 0,113 1,882 
Transportation 15 0,060 0,785 0,121 1,066 
Retail 23 0,055 0,425 0,127 1,251 
Finance 64 0,038 0,701 -0,020 -0,376 
Service 47 0,104 0,630 0,096 1,310 
Total 259     
 
This point of view on sample performance does not significantly differ from demands and 
market capitalization perspectives. Visually the picture remains similar as all groups demonstrate 
positive abnormal returns at the date of the event. 
 
Figure 14. 7-days CAARs by different divisions of targets 
In the short-term, the highest return is shown by the combined group of Construction, 
Mining, Wholesale and Trade that accumulated around 15%. The lowest returns are shown by 
companies from finance sector that might be justified by their more regulated operations and high 
correlation of their stock performance with their portfolio’s performance in the case of funds and 
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REITs. As for the significance, t-test results do not provide any statistically significant result in 
the short run. 
Conducting event-study analysis for these groups in the long-run demonstrated the 
following results: 
 
Figure 15.  127-days CAARs by different divisions of targets 
In the long-run, finance division of companies is the only group which CAAR not just 
diminished significantly, but resulted in the negative zone. The combined group generated the 
highest return in 127-day period as it did in the short period, while others’ CAARs closed around 
12%. Classifying the sample by divisions of companies’ operations does not provided many 
significant results in long run as well. Only the combined group of companies and stocks 
representing Manufacturing division are significant at 10% level.  
To sum up the result, the total sample of 259 campaigns run by the most active activist 
hedge funds during the last five years demonstrates significant positive abnormal returns around 
the date of 13D Schedule filing. Therefore, the obtained outcome of the research proves the 
hypothesis that activist hedge funds interventions in companies increases targets’ shareholders’ 
wealth.  
Table 8. Event-study results 
# Campaigns 
CAAR  
(-7;7) 
t-test 
 (-7;7) 
CAAR 
 (-127;127) 
t-test  
(-127;127) 
259 0,073 3,089 0,089 2,202 
 
The result also demonstrates market efficiency – the biggest part of abnormal return 
occurs during the first few day after the announcement, however, the positive drift further is 
important for further discussion.  
The paper also made an attempt to conduct the analysis for different demands, targets’ 
market capitalizations and divisions of operations, however, in the most cases due to small 
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sample in total and subsamples for the intended for the further analysis, the results are 
insignificant in the most cases, however, abnormal returns are positive in all cases and visually 
results are similar in the most cases. Further we discuss the obtained results from managerial 
point of view.  
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Chapter III. Discussion 
§1. Managerial implications and discussion 
This paper aimed to define whether activist hedge funds entry in a company increases the 
targets’ shareholders’ wealth. Hedge funds are the most aggressive investors seeking short-term 
profits that is why many practitioners and scholars challenge activists’ intentions and proposals. 
Another factor against hedge fund activism is their perception as belligerent corporate raiders 
rather than responsible investors unlocking value of firms by some of the market participants. The 
literature review section provides arguments for and against activism and describes why there is 
no consensus in the literature. That is why an activist hedge fund acquisition of a stake in a 
company raises such questions for shareholders of target company as what to expect from activists 
and their proposals and how their engagement with the board and proposed changes can affect 
stock prices and shareholder’s wealth accordingly.  
The result of conducted event-study in this paper shows, that stock prices of target 
companies experience positive abnormal returns around the Schedule 13D filing by activist hedge 
funds. This result is consistent with other works dedicated to the topic as other researchers also 
found that stock prices of companies approached by activists experience abnormal returns in the 
short-term, while others even claim that the positive effect lasts for several years (Akhigbe, 
Madura, 1997). However, many of these papers’ results are not significant at conventional levels. 
The most important result of this paper is that outcome of event-study not just demonstrated 
positive abnormal returns, but also provided significant results at conventional levels. This means 
that shareholders of approached companies experience positive changes in their wealth.  
As it was covered earlier, stock prices reflect market expectations on further performance 
of a company as new information comes up. Significant positive abnormal return may signalize 
that the market views activist hedge funds positively or, as activists’ intervention is always 
accompanied with a proposal, the market also positively reacts on these proposals. That is why 
some may claim that taking into account all recent trends in investing, activists are indeed good 
investors which action may cause positive changes in corporate governance, operational or 
financial performance. However, the issue regarding influence of activism on these items are left 
beyond this research, rather, it focuses on stock performance and what it implies for shareholders 
in both short and long-term.  
The results of the research show that results are quite good and shareholders benefit from 
intervention in short term and that cumulative return rises during the consecutive six calendar 
month, on average. It was found, that average abnormal return on the date of filing Schedule 13D 
is 4,7%, while it rises to 7,3% during the first 7 business days and to 8,9% during the following 
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127 days. Some may assume that this statistic demonstrates good investing opportunity, but 
different proposals have different market reactions that should be analyzed and at different time 
frames before stating it for sure. The paper made such an attempt by conducting additional event-
study analysis by viewing at the sample throw different perspectives and using 7- and 127- day 
time frame.  
First of all, no matter what company is targeted and what are the pursued goals of activists, 
the target experience abnormal positive returns during the first seven days. But in the long run 
stock performance varies in accordance with different factors. First of all, the paper analyzed stock 
price reaction on different demands. In the long-run, the highest return is demonstrated by demands 
on selling company or activists’ intention to acquire the target. As it was discussed, the continuous 
abnormal return is associated with expected higher price of acquisition. The decision on investing 
in a target company in this case depends on investors’ view on the activist and its chances of 
pursuing the board. That is the case when activist reputation and experience plays huge role. This 
paper shows significant results in outcomes of these demands and as the sample includes famous 
frequent activists that are big enough to acquire at least 5% stake in targets and, therefore, have a 
real chance to get the deal done, being part of such a deal is considered a good investing 
opportunity. Profitable investing in companies that are under pressure with other proposals may 
not be feasible as CAARs of these proposals remain flat or go down. 
Secondly, investigating approached companies as investing opportunities is presumably 
reasonable throw the prism of market capitalization of targets. The research outcome shows that 
only mid and small cap stocks experience continuous increase in CAARs. As it was discussed, 
those companies are the most frequent targets, because in the case of nano cap stocks managers 
may use poison pills, while proxy fighting with large cap companies is costly and results are not 
clearly predictable. 
Finally, the paper made an attempt to analyze stock performance depending on division of 
company operations. This parameter does not provide clear results, as the most groups ended up 
with almost the same CAARs at the end of six-month period. The combined group of Mining, Oil 
and Gas, Wholesale trade and others demonstrated the highest return, however, the sample is too 
small to make inference. However, the most volatile result is demonstrated by finance division, 
that is why investing in such companies during activism campaign requires thorough 
consideration. 
To sum up, an activists’ filing Schedule 13D increases the target’s shareholders’ wealth in 
the short term in spite of the intention. In the most cases, the market is efficient and the biggest 
portion of CAAR is implemented in stock prices during the first several days after the event, thus, 
beneficiaries of activists’ intervention are the investors that had stakes before the event. However, 
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proposal regarding selling the company to a third party or to acquire it by activist himself can 
provide a solid investing opportunities even for those investing after the event date. Applying this 
factor to middle and small cap stock may provide a solid investing opportunity: 17 campaign from 
the sample satisfied this condition and event-study shows that 8,2% abnormal return on the event 
date, CAAR(-7;7) equals 16,6%, CAAR(-127;127) is 25,7% while the last one is significant at 
conventional significance levels. Therefore, that is worth of further investigation. 
§2. Research limitations and further discussion 
The obtained empirical results and managerial implications were discussed, however, there 
are certain research limitations that should be covered. The first and the most important concern 
is the sample size. The sample includes the most frequent hedge funds activist campaign during 
the last five years that required Schedule 13D filing. Basically, the sample is limited to the amount 
of campaigns run within the period concerned. In total, there were 312 campaigns satisfying 
proposed conditions, but as it was decided to exclude investments in other hedge funds and REITs, 
the sample size was decreased to only 259 campaigns.  
This sample size is large enough for testing the hypothesis and producing significant 
outcomes, however, as the paper makes an attempt to conduct event-study analysis via different 
perspectives – activists’ demands, targets’ capitalization and divisions of operations, the research 
struggles from small sample categories within each of the category. In many cases, obtained results 
are not significant, or subsample is too small to make any inferences while showing significant 
results according to t-test.  
The problem of small subsamples may be solved by combining some categories as the 
research does with grouping Construction, Mining, Oil and Gas, Wholesale trade division together. 
However, the logic of getting different groups together is not always applicable. In the case of 
division of operations, distinguishing between different groups is a point of interest on exploring 
the market reaction on them, rather having a hypothesis of different performance in dependence 
on this criterion. However, due to different and actually contrary demands, combing small 
subsamples does not have a reasonable justification, as it would result in aggregated results that 
do not demonstrate absolutely different market reaction on Oppose Sale and Shareholder Rights 
demands, for example. The same principle applies to market capitalization criterion, as different 
market caps directly affect activists’ chance on running a successful campaign, not mentioning 
different prices behavior of various capitalization stocks. 
Moreover, the deeper analysis of activist demands can be conducted further. However, it 
is a challenging task due to the following issues. The first problem is that it is not always clear 
what are the demands of shareholders at the moment of filing 13D Schedule. Some activists state 
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in Item 4 of the schedule their concrete reason, but in the most cases a wide wording is used. The 
most frequent one is that a company is undervalued and represents a good investing opportunity. 
That is why activists demands become publicly available after activists’ letters publishing or 
company executives’ interviews. That is why the market not always understands what are the exact 
motives of activists.  
The second point is that the market reaction on proxy fights should be analyzed. Proxy 
fights or contest is a continuous process without a clear predictable outcome. On the one hand, 
activists win 0,64 board seats per campaign on average, that means the win is more likely. On the 
other, the statistic imbeds campaign with several seats requests that dilutes win percentage per 
campaign and executives use different defending schemes like poison pills.  
Therefore, an alternative date for analysis could be the proxy fight results announcement. 
At this moment, the described problem of unclear activists’ goals is solved, but a new issue arises. 
What outcome is considered as a win? In the case of one demand – board representation, the 
answer is clear, but in the case of multiple proposals the task becomes more complicated.  
To generalize things mentioned about activists demands, the paper made an attempt to split 
proposals and analyze market reaction on each of them. However, due to the small sample, unclear 
demands priority taken from Thomson Reuters report and multiplicity of simultaneous demands 
not clearly stated at the moment of filing Schedule 13D, the results may turn out so be deceptive. 
However, it is important to remind, that the market expectations about companies’ future after 
activists’ entry are positive that resulted in high average abnormal return at the date of event and 
values of CAARs.  
It should be stated, that it is possible to increase the sample size by either considering a 
longer time frame or including campaigns that did not required acquisition of 5% stake in a 
company. In the literature section of the research it was said, that the market’s perception of 
activists and their proposal evolves over time and that the research aims to define the most recent 
market reaction on activists’ entry. Including campaigns that were not associated with mailing 
Schedule 13D is an option, but the task of clear event date identification becomes extremely 
challenging. In the case of Schedule 13D the event date is defined by publication of the report on 
SEC website, but in the second case a researcher has to find the first mentioning of the campaign 
in some public sources such as activists’ websites or news in financial magazines that is extremely 
time consuming and may spoil clean event-study if an error occurs.  
Also, in managerial discussion section of the work, a notion is made that the results raise a 
question on how react on the information of activist hedge funds’ stake acquisition in a target 
company. Looking at stock performance in dependence on combination of different factors such 
activists’ demand, market cap and division of target, creates a field for investigation of short-term 
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investing opportunity for third parties. Moreover, the reasons behind occasional falling CAARs 
should be examined; a possible hit of this drop is that it is associated with actual activists’ 
performance and chances to win over the board and management.  
To sum up, the research made significant contribution to the topic by demonstrating that 
activists’ entry in a company is associated with significant positive abnormal return and makes 
attempt to define the link between different criterions of a deal and target’s stock performance. 
The main limitation of this research is the sample size that is very limited due to small amount of 
total activist hedge funds campaigns run over the last five years. The sample could be extended by 
taking into account other campaigns that were not required mailing Schedule 13D, but as it was 
discussed, this extension leads to issue in identification of the event date. The further research can 
be conducted by addressing the same questions but by conducting an event-study on bigger 
sample. 
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Conclusions 
This paper aimed to define how the market reacts on activist hedge fund entry in a target 
company and what does it mean to other shareholders of the firm. The hypothesis was that stocks 
of approached companies experience an abnormal significant return at the date of filing Schedule 
13D that is required by US SEC when a fund acquires stake exceeding 5% of a company and has 
an intention to engage with the board. Indeed, the hypothesis was confirmed as the event-study 
result showed significant abnormal returns around the announcement date. Significance of the 
obtained results is the major outcome of the paper that filled in the research gap as recent studies 
on the issue lacked significance of the results or the sample used in research does not include 
recent campaigns and thus does not reflect the most recent attitude of market towards activists.  
Moreover, the paper made an attempt to analyze market reaction on campaigns using 
several criterions. First of all, activists’ demands were analyzed both in short and long-term. It was 
found that the highest cumulative average abnormal return was demonstrated by stocks 
approached with the intention to sell a company to the third party or to acquire it by activists 
themselves. The result is consistent with conventional stock behavior when a rumor of or actual 
acquisition bid is made. Secondly, stock performance was analyzed via prism of market 
capitalization of targets. The top performers are small and mid- cap stocks, while CAARs of others 
went down in the six-month period that is consistent with the statistics of the most frequent targets 
of activists. Launching activist campaigns on large capitalization companies requires significant 
capital and is costly as executives of these firms have tools and experience of coping with activists, 
while nano-cap stocks are speculative in their nature and this type of event may not embed a 
significant information. Next, the decision was made to group sample in accordance with 
companies’ divisions of operations in accordance with Standard Industrial Classification system, 
however, the analysis did not provide unexpected results as long-term CAARs ended up in the 
close corridor of values. Also, obtained results serve as a base for further investigation on stock 
performances depending on the chosen criterions, but on the bigger sample; it is reasonable to 
conduct several researches by analyzing one factor a piece.  
The main limitation of the research is the sample size. It is big enough to provide significant 
outcome and meet research goal, however, splitting the whole sample in different categories led 
to small subsamples and nonsignificant results in many cases. Further research can be extended 
by including campaigns that were not accompanied with mailing Schedule 13D, however, as it 
was discussed such inclusion considerably complicates the process of sample collection. 
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